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PROBABILISTIC INfERENCE AND PROBABILISTIC REASONING* 
Henry E. Kyburg, jr. University of Rochester 
1. Probabilistic Reasoning 
Uncertainty enters into human reasoning and inference in at least 
two ways. It is reasonable to suppose that" there will be roles for these 
distinct uses of uncertainty also in automated reasoning. 
One role for uncertainty concerns ch9ices among alternative 
actions. For good reasons, a conce'ption of uncertainty that did not satisfy 
the probability axioms, but that was used for computing expected utilities, 
would lead the ag�nt into decisions under which the agent would come out 
on the short end in every eventuality (Ramsey, 1950). Uncertainty, 
construed in this way, is what we need for computing the expectations that 
are fed into decision rules, the most common and persuasive of which is 
the rule to maximize expected utility. 
Uncertainty need not be represented by a single classical 
probability function; if uncertainties are represented in some more general 
fashion, what the Dutch Book argument shows is that there should exist 
some classical probability function that is compatible with that more 
general representation. It has been argued (Levi, 1980; Kyburg, 1987) that 
the most general form of representation for these uncertainties is that of a 
set of classical probability functions, having a convex hull, defined over an 
algebra of propositions. Such a representation includes as special cases 
belief functions (Shafer, 1976) and m?st interval representations of 
uncertainty. Less general f9rms of convexity, for example, in which a set of 
parameterized probability functions is taken to be convex over values of 
the parameter, are also of interest. Manipulating probability and utility 
representations, seeing which ones are consistent with which, or which 
imply which, constitutes one form of probabilistic reasoning. It is this kind 
of reasoning that Nilsson ( 1986) considers to be the appropriate subject 
matter of ·probabilistic logic. 
· 
In addition to merely representing uncertainty and employing it in 
decision theory, we are concerned with how uncertainties are modified or 
updated in response to evidence. The classical way of doing this, for 
classical probabilities, is by means of Bayes' theorem: if£ becomes known, 
is accepted as evidence, then the ,new or updated probability P' of any 
statement H in our algebra becomes the old probability of H multiplied by 
the ratio of the likelihood of H on .E to the old probability of £: 
P'(H) = P(H) * (P(£1H) I P(£)) 
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This is called confirmational conditionalization. A more general 
procedure is jeffrey Conditionalization (jeffrey, 196 S ), which applies when 
we undergo some experience or make some observation whose import is 
exactly to lead us to shift some probability from P( £) toP'( £). Then the 
new probability of every other statement becomes: 
P'(H) = P(HJ£)* P'( £) + P(HI- £)( 1 -P'( £)) 
Confirmational conditionalization can be extended to the more 
general approach that represents uncertainty by convex sets of classical 
probabilities: it can be shown that if each classical probability function in a 
convex set of probability functions is updated by conditionalizing on the 
. evidence £, the result will be a new convex set of classical probability 
functions, provided .E does not have zero probability on all the original 
probability f�nctions (Kyburg, 1987). 
There are other ways in which one might want to update 
probabilities than by conditionalization. Certain forms of direct inference, 
in which probabilities are derived from knowledge of statistics are one 
possibility. But while any of these procedures has a perfect right to be 
called 'probabilistic reasoning, ' they are not what I mean by probabilistic 
inference. 
2. Probabilistic Reasoning 
In inference, in general, one begins with certain statements or 
propositions (repre�entations of states of affairs), oremises. and goes 
through a process that leads to another statement, the conclusion. From 
"Tosses of this coin are independent and heads occur half the time," we 
infer, not probabilistically, but deductively, that if we know that heads has 
occurred on the first toss of a pair, then the probability that heads also 
occurred on the second toss of the pair is a half . .  We infer, not 
probabilistically, but deductively, that triples of tosses consisting of three 
heads occur an eighth of the time. We infer, not probabilistically, but 
deductively, that if our sample of nfrom P is random with respect to Jr. 
then the probability is at least 0.9 1 that the proportion of P that are .Rlies 
within 3/( 4n) V2 of the observed sample population. 
In ordinary deductive logic, the process of inference is such as to 
preserve truth: if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. Note that the 
probabilistic reasoning mentioned above fits into this deductive pattern. 
A sound deductive argument is one in which the premises are true 
and the argument valid. In most �pplications of deductive inference, the 
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premises may be warranted, firmly believed, accepted as practically 
certain. Sometimes the premises are merely accepted hypothetically, or for 
the purposes of argument. To have reason to believe a valid deductive 
argument is sound is precisely to have reason to believe that its premises 
are t�ue. . 
� 
Often a valid deductive inference provides warrant for accepting 
its conclusion. But not always: confronted with the validity of the 
inference: "All swans are white; Sam is a black Australian swan; Therefore 
Sam is white," we opt for the rejection of the universal premise rather than 
for the (inconsistent) inclusion of the consequence. 
Spelling out the conditions under which valid deductive inference 
provides warrant for its conclusions is not trivial. It is not trivial because 
it depends on spelling out the justification for the premises of a deductive 
argument. 
3. Ampliative Inference. 
What is controversial is whether or not there is any form of 
inference other than deductive inference. There is a tradition in philosophy 
that considers "inductive" or "ampliative" inference. There is a new 
tradition, in artificial intelligence, according to which inference proceeds by 
rules that may not be truth-preserving in the sense that an addition to our 
knowledge base may require the rejection of a once acceptable conclusion. 
Such non-monotonic rules will lead to truth for the most part. 
David Israel (1986) suggests that there is no other logic. but that 
"real" inference proceeds in non-deductive ways. This is just what 
inductive or ampliative inference, or more recently scientific inference, or 
non-monotonic infernce, has been concerned with. Whether or not it is to 
be called a "logic" seems unimportant. 
In artificial intelligence, .this search is to be found in the search for 
representations of non-monotonic reasoning, such as circumscription, 
non-monotonic logics, default logics, and the like. We want to be able to 
infer that Tweety can fly. Since the kinds of inference under investigation 
do not preserve truth, we have to be able to back up: if we el)large the 
premiss set, we may have to shrink the conclusion set. Non-monotonic 
inference is not generally taken to be probabilistic, but work on 
non-monotonic logic suggests that there is interest in inference rules -­
that is, rules that lead from premises to the acceptance of a conclusion -­
that need not be truth preserving. Many people want to be able to detach 
conclusions from their premises. Not all approaches to non-monotonic logic 
allow full detachment; de Kleer's ATMS (de Kleet, 1986), for example, 
requires that tags reflecting the assumptions used in an inference be 
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carried along with the conclusions. 
4. Why Accept? 
There may be a sense in which, when I choose to bet at even 
money on heads rather than on tails, I may be said to be "accepting" the 
hypothesis that heads will come up. This is not an interesting sense of 
acceptance. Decision theory can account for such usages. I shall speak of 
accepting S only when I am adding S to my knowledge base, using S as a 
premise in deductive arguments I take to be sound, using S as evidence in 
inductive arguments, etc. 
Despite the fact that some people are interested in non-deductive 
inference, we may still sensibly ask why they should be: Why should we 
accept any statements that are not (say) mathematical or logical truths? It 
might be thought that we couldn't use conditionalization for updating 
without acceptance: after all, when we update on evidence £, we take the 
probability of £ to be one. And once a statement has a probability of 1 (or 
of 0) that probability can never be changed by conditionalization. But 
there are other ways to handle updating: jeffrey's rule, for example, or 
various net-propagation procedures, such as Pearl's (Pearl, 1986 ). 
In principle, there is no reason that human or machine knowledge 
in a certain domain should not be represented by a complete algebra of 
statements and a classical probability measure (or a set of classical 
probability measures) over them, in which no empirical statement ever 
receives a probability of 0 or 1. Such a system would have no need for 
probabilistic rules of inference; it would employ only deductive rules for 
manipulating probabilities. 
While such a system would be conceptually simple, it would not 
reflect the way in which people function epistemologically. We are willing 
to assert categorically a large number of propositions that could 
conceivably be false. Perhaps more to the point, the progress of science 
depends on the categorical acceptance of such statements as: measure-ment 
m is not in error by more than !::.. The efforts of engineers in designing a 
tool or a product depend on their ability to take as given such possibly 
erroneous statements as those concerning strength of materials, 
conductivity, ... Such statements we take as premises in deductive 
arguments, whose conclusions we therefore also accept. We are willing to 
take such statements as evidence-- e.g., I take as evidence the statement 
that about SO% of tosses result in heads; it is relative to this evidence that I 
assign a probability of heads on the next toss of about .S. 
Our empirical scientific knowledge is expressed, not in probabilities 
(for the most part) but in categorical statements. Is this an idealization? 
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Perhaps. But the fact that it is such a pervasive idealization suggests that 
there is a reason for it, and that we might be well advised to emulate it in 
our formal representations. 
5. Models of Probabilistic Inference. 
In testing a statistical hypothesis, the standard goal is to devise a 
rule that will erroneou·sly reject that hypothesis no more than ex: of the 
time. Such a test will lead you to a false rejection no more frequently than 
ex: (Lehman, 1959). Of course ex: is a free parameter; but we choose ex: to be 
small enough that the possibility of making this sort of error in a given. 
context does not worry us. The size ex: we choose reflects how seriously we 
take the mistake in question. If it is very serious, we want to be very sure 
(but we can't ask for a guarantee) that it won't happen. 
It is very bad form to say of a hypothesis that has been rejected at 
the level ex: that the probability is at most ex: that it was falsely rejected. But 
as Birnbaum has pointed out (Birnbaum, 1969 ) , while we can learn not to 
say such things, it is hard to know what else to think. 
Consider the simplest and most elegant of all forms of statistical 
inference: you have a normally distributed quantity X, but you don't know 
the parameters of its distribution. Neverthele·ss, since you know that it is 
normally distributed, you know the distribution of the quantity t= 1V ,(��(x 
-1-l)(s-1 ), where .rand s are the sample mean and standard deviation, atad 
1-1 is the unknown population mean. Knowing the distribution of t. you can 
therefore compute the probability, for example, that 
.r- tsl N112 < 1.1 < .r+ tsl N112. 
If you pick some probability level that makes you feel comfortable under 
the circumstances, and you are indifferent between over and 
underestimating 1.1. then you will have an exact interval estimate of the 
unknown mean IJ, indexed by fp: a level of fiducial probability or practical 
certainty. 
Note that this inference is non-monotonic: on observing a further 
sample from the population it may well be that some different interval for 
1.1 will be acceptable at the index fp. 
Or consider the most common form of confidence interval 
inference: you have a binomial population with an unknown parameter r; 
you draw a sample from the population, and observe a relative frequency 
f; you construct a class of·intervals (pJ,Pu) such that whatever the true 
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value of r may be, the probability is at least p that the sample frequency 
will fall in the corresponding interval. But it will have done this if and on/; 
if r lies between a certain maximum and a certain minimum value. These 
values determine what is called a confidence intervaL and in particular, a 
1 00 p% confidence interval, since its limits require the specification of an 
acceptable p. 
In philosophy, Levi ( 1967) is concerned with the circumstances 
under which one ought to add a hypothesis to one's corpus of knowledge. 
The famous .Hule A for doing so ii.1volves, in addition to the probability of 
the hypothesis, a measure of the epistemic content of the hypothesis, and a · 
further parameter q, which varies from 0 to 1 and is called an index of 
caution. 
In artificial intelligence Matthew Ginsberg ( 1985) applies a 
technique much like that of binomial confidence interval inference (the 
main difference being that he uses a rougher approximation) to the 
problem of inferring an interval characterizing the reliability of a default 
rule in non-monotonic logic. In order to do this, he finds it necessary to 
introduce a parameter g, analogous to the fiducial parameter fp, which he 
calls "gullibility." 
6. Probabilistic Acceptance. 
The simplest and most natural idea for acceptance in AI iS' just to 
accept those statements whose probability exceeds a certain critical 
number. This number may have to be changed to reflect different 
circumstances -- it will be context dependent -- but so, we may suppose, 
are c.:, g � p, and fpcontext dependent. 
In what way is acceptance level context dependent? One natural 
answer is that acceptance level depends on what is, or might be expected 
to be, at stake. If the range of stakes we are contemplating is limited --for 
example, it can 't be more than 10 to 1 -- then probabilities greater than .9 
are behaviorally indistinguishable 'from probabilities of 1. and probabilities 
of less than .1 are indistinguishable from probabilities of 0. 
It also follows from these considerations that probabilities larger 
than the level of acceptance, or smaller than 1 - th� level of acceptance, are 
just not significant as probabilities. It makes no sense to bet at odds of 
1000:1 on a statement that gets its probability from a statistical statement 
whose acceptance level is only .99. Ifyou're only 99% sure that the coin 
lands heads between .48 and .52 of the time, you should not be willing to 
bet at odds of a thousand to one than in 12 tosses you won't get 12 heads. 
Most of the acceptance rules mentioned above run afoul of the 
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lottery paradox (Kyburg, 196 1). That is, each of a set of statements 5�· (e.g., 
"ticket i will not win the lottery") may be probable enough to be accepted, 
and at the same time they may jointly contradict other accepted 
statements (e.g., "there will be a winner"). An exception is the acceptance 
principle advocated by Levi, which links acceptance to expected epistemic 
utility; only statements demonstrably consistent with what you have 
already accepted are candidates for future acceptance. 
How serious the lottery paradox is depends on what other 
machinery you have. It is not deadly if you limit yourself to a 
probabilistic rule of acceptance. It will follow that any logical consequence 
of a single statement in your corpus of knowledge should also be in it; but 
it will not follow that every consequence of the set of sentences in. your 
corpus will also be in it. The latter would indeed lead to a hopeless sort of 
inconsistency; the former would not. If the size of the lottery is adjusted 
to my level of acceptance, I will answer your question about whether ticket 
i will win with a categorical "no." But I will answer your question about 
whether it is true that neither ticket i nor ticket j will win by saying, "I 
don't know; but the probability is thus and so. 
This seems not unreasonable. Look at the matter another way:. 
given a deductive argument from premises }:} , ... , Pn to a conclusion C. 
consider whether the argument obligates you to accept C. It seems natural 
to say that more is required than merely that� of the premises be 
accepted; I must also be willing to accept the conjunction of the premises. 
This feature might even be advantageous in A I. There is surely an 
epistemic difference between a conclusion reached in one step from a 
single premise, and a conclusion that requires a large number of steps and 
premises. This difference disappears if the acceptability of the single 
premise of the first agument is no greater than that of the conjunction of 
all the premises in the second argument. A purely probabilistic rule of 
acceptance automatically reflects this fact . .  
7. Conclusion. 
It is important to distinguish probabilistic reasoning from 
probabilistic inference. Probabilistic reasoning may concern the 
manipulation of probabilities in the context of decision theory, or it may 
involve the updating of probabilities in the light of new evidence via Bayes' 
theorem or some other procedure. Both of these operations are essentially 
deductive in character. 
Contrasted with these procedures of manipulating or computing 
with probabilities, is the use of probabilistic rules of inference: rules that 
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lead from one sentence (or a set of sentences) to another sentence. but do 
so in a way that need not be truth preserving. 
Instances of such rules are those represented by circumscription. 
non-monotonic logic. default rules. etc. as well as several classes of 
inference rules associated with statistics. and some r.ules discussed by 
philosophers. 
The simplest probabilistic rule of inference -- a high probability 
rule--has some curious consequences (the lottery paradox). but it does not 
seem that these consequences need interfere_ with the useful application of 
the rule. Other rules also lead to the lottery paradox. 
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